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The Economic Logic of a Fresh Start
U.S. law gives debtors the right 
to petition a bankruptcy court and 
ask to be released from their financial 
obligations to creditors. For reasons ex-
plained in this article, a debtor’s right 
to have his or her debts dismissed or 
discharged via a bankruptcy proceed-
ing is referred to as the law’s “fresh 
start” provision. Fresh start has been 
— and continues to be — a controver-
debtor’s right to have his or her debts 
dismissed or discharged via a bankruptcy 
proceeding is referred to as the law’s “fresh 
start” provision. Fresh start has been — and 
continues to be — a controversial feature of the U.S. 
bankruptcy law. Lately, the law has come under scrutiny 
because of the dramatic rise in personal bankruptcy 
filings over the past 25 years. In this article, Satyajit 
Chatterjee explains the economic logic underlying the 
fresh start concept. He also argues that this logic can 
explain why opposition to a discharge policy has waxed 
and waned over time.
sial feature of U.S. bankruptcy law. Of 
late, the law has come under scrutiny 
because of the dramatic rise in per-
sonal bankruptcy filings in the last 25 
years. In 2005, roughly one out of every 
75 U.S. households took advantage of 
the fresh start provision; in 1980, only 
one out of 375 households did.
The need to deal in some fashion 
with people who cannot (or will not) 
repay their debts was felt from the 
earliest days of European settlement 
in New England. By and large, the 
colonists dealt harshly with defaulters 
and were quite hostile to the idea of 
the discharge of personal debts. But 
this hostility appears to have waned by 
the late 19th century, when Congress 
enacted a federal bankruptcy law with 
a fresh start provision. Unlike earlier 
attempts at legalizing discharge, the 
1898 law proved to be more perma-
nent, although later laws modified 
many of its provisions. The latest 
turn in this gradual evolution is the 
Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and 
Consumer Protection Act of 2005, a 
law that significantly curtails a debtor’s 
right to a fresh start.
The objective of this article is 
twofold. The first is to explain the 
economic logic underlying the fresh 
start concept. For there is an economic 
logic – one that gets ignored when 
advocates portray fresh start as a form 
of protection against rapacious credi-
tors or when opponents portray it as a 
refuge for the morally bankrupt. The 
economic logic puts debtors and credi-
tors on an equal footing but argues 
that, under certain circumstances, 
society as a whole is better off when 
discharge is permitted. The second 
objective is to argue that this logic can 
explain why opposition to a discharge 
policy has waxed and waned over time. 
Why did the colonists view discharge 
with hostility? Why did this opposi-
tion wane by the turn of the previous 
century? Why has opposition to a fresh 
start reappeared now? The economic 
logic of a fresh start suggests that these 
shifts in attitude reflect an evolving 
tradeoff between the economic costs 
and benefits of a fresh start.
WHAT IS A FRESH START?
U.S. bankruptcy law permits an 
individual debtor to be released from 
his or her financial obligations to cur-
rent creditors. The main requirement 
for obtaining this release, or discharge, 
of debt is that the debtor must sur-
render to creditors whatever property 
he or she has at the time the discharge 
is sought. By surrendering all existing 2   Q1  2008 Business Review   www.philadelphiafed.org
property to creditors, a debtor who 
is unable or unwilling to repay all of 
his or her debt can obtain permanent 
protection from collection efforts by 
current creditors.
There are some exceptions to this 
general provision of the law. On the li-
ability side, not all financial obligations 
are eligible for discharge. Examples of 
nondischargeable obligations include 
student loans and judgments incurred 
in judicial court cases. On the asset 
side, debtors are not required to sur-
render certain assets to creditors. For 
instance, in Florida and Texas, home 
equity is exempt from seizure by credi-
tors. In addition, any property essential 
to a person’s livelihood or dignity (such 
as tools used by a carpenter to do his 
job, ordinary clothes, and so forth) is 
generally exempt from seizure by credi-
tors as well.1 
The term fresh start is used to 
describe this provision of bankruptcy 
law because it neatly encapsulates the 
spirit of an oft-cited justification for 
discharge given in a 1934 ruling by the 
U.S. Supreme Court. According to the 
court, discharge of debt “gives to the 
honest but unfortunate debtor who 
surrenders for distribution the property 
which he owns  at the time of bank-
ruptcy a new opportunity in life and 
a clear field for future effort, unham-
pered by the pressure and discourage-
ment of preexisting debt.”2
 To understand the economic logic 
of the fresh start provision, we should 
view the need for this provision from 
two closely related, but distinct, per-
1 Other exceptions exist to prevent abuse of the 
provision. For instance, shifting one’s wealth 
into nonexempt assets shortly before filing for 
bankruptcy is viewed as an abuse and will make 
the debtor ineligible for a fresh start. Similarly, 
the right to a discharge is not available to a 
debtor who has used this provision in the previ-
ous six years — so “serial” discharge is viewed 
as an abuse and is not permitted.
2 Local Loan Co. vs. Hunt U.S. 234, 244 (1934).
spectives. The first is the situation as 
it relates to a debtor and creditor after 
debt has been incurred (what econo-
mists call the ex-post perspective). The 
second perspective is the situation as it 
relates to potential debtors and credi-
tors before any debt is incurred (what 
economists call the ex-ante perspec-
tive). The desirability of a fresh start 
can be argued from either perspective, 
but the nature of the argument is dif-
ferent in the two cases and therefore 
best discussed separately. As we will 
see, both perspectives are implicit in 
the famous Supreme Court justifica-
tion for a fresh start quoted earlier.3 
FRESH START FROM THE
POST-DEBT PERSPECTIVE
To understand the post-debt logic 
for having a fresh start provision, we 
need to be clear about what transpires 
in its absence. In most modern socie-
ties, contract law gives creditors the 
right to seize the property of a debtor 
who does not repay his or her debts. If 
the debtor lacks sufficient property, the 
law permits creditors to garnish the 
debtor’s earnings in excess of what is 
needed by the debtor to meet non-
discretionary expenses. Importantly, 
these creditors’ rights continue to be 
in force as long as there is some unmet 
financial obligation. It is against these 
creditors’ rights that the fresh start 
provision extends protection.
Since this article is about the 
economic logic of a fresh start, and the 
logic can be somewhat subtle, it helps 
to talk about the issues by using an 
example. I will introduce the example 
in this section and progressively extend 
it in the following two sections. In this 
section, I use the example to make 
clear one reason why unrestricted 
creditors’ rights can be bad for society.
Consider the case of a debtor, 
whom we shall call D, who has bor-
rowed from a creditor, C, and her 
payment on the debt is now due. 
Assume also that D has no assets and 
her obligation to C amounts to $5000. 
Further assume that D’s monthly take-
home pay from her regular full-time 
job totals $2000 and her monthly 
nondiscretionary expenses are $1800. 
Since D does not have the funds to 
pay off her obligation, she is in default. 
According to the law, C has the right 
to seize $200 from D each month for 
the next 25 months in order to recover 
what is owed to him.4
However, matters may unfold dif-
ferently. Imagine that D has the option 
to reduce her hours at her job so as 
In most modern 
societies, contract 
law gives creditors 
the right to seize the 
property of a debtor 
who does not repay 
his or her debts.
3 The language of the Supreme Court ruling 
points to a set of core issues that any discus-
sion of fresh start should cover. A complete and 
thorough discussion of all aspects of fresh start 
would be well beyond the scope of this article. 
The last two chapters of Thomas Jackson’s book 
and the article by Michelle White provide more 
details about the costs and benefits of fresh 
start. The article by Michel Robe, Eva-Maria 
Steiger, and Pierre-Armand Michel provides 
further background on the nature of fresh start. 
Also, I do not discuss a second form of bank-
ruptcy — called Chapter 13 — in this article. In 
a Chapter 13 bankruptcy, the debtor is allowed 
to keep his or her assets in return for agreeing to 
a new repayment schedule that involves a par-
tial discharge of debt. Historically, only a third 
of bankruptcy filings in the U.S. have been 
Chapter 13 filings; the rest are of the fresh start 
variety.  For a nice discussion of Chapter 13 
bankruptcy, see the article by Wenli Li.
4 Actually, the law would permit C to recover 
more than $5000 because recovery takes time 
and C loses interest on the part of the debt yet 
to be repaid. Taking compensation for lost inter-
est into account would require D to pay $200 
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to make her monthly take-home pay 
exactly $1800. If D chooses to do this, 
C can no longer seize any income from 
D because D does not have any discre-
tionary income. D may prefer this “less 
work” option to the option of working 
full-time and having her additional 
$200 a month “taxed” away by C for 
the next two years. Of course, this less 
work option will keep D under the 
threat of garnishment indefinitely, but 
the benefits of working full-time and 
eventually becoming debt-free come 
too far in the future for D to make the 
extra effort.
This outcome is inefficient be-
cause D clearly values the extra $200 a 
month more than the effort required to 
earn it — which is why she was work-
ing full-time in the first place. But now 
C’s right as a creditor stops D from 
doing so. Society’s loss is the $200 D 
could earn, net of her efforts to earn 
it. One might wonder why the loss to 
society does not include the $5000 loss 
to C, but from a societal point of view, 
C’s loss is exactly offset by D’s gain.5 
In this example C’s rights as a 
creditor force D to obtain her dis-
cretionary income in a form that C 
cannot seize, that is, in the form of 
leisure. One can also imagine D’s be-
ing induced to engage in activities that 
allow her to hide her earnings from C, 
for instance, doing informal work for 
friends and relatives or engaging in il-
legal activities. If these alternatives are 
inferior (from society’s point of view) 
to D’s working full-time at her regu-
lar job, the inefficiency remains and 
is perhaps compounded. In general, 
whenever a debtor has the option to 
substitute nonseizable forms of income 
for regular earnings, unbridled credi-
tors’ rights can cause a costly distor-
tion of work effort. In such situations, 
an efficiency case can be made for 
constraining a creditor’s rights. Indeed, 
if D is given the right of discharge, she 
will avail herself of it and continue 
working full-time at her regular job 
and the loss to society will be avoid-
ed.6 This is the economic justification 
for discharge implicit in the Supreme 
Court’s statement that discharge gives 
a debtor “new opportunity in life and 
a clear field for future effort, unham-
pered by the pressure and discourage-
ment of preexisting debt.”
But this post-debt justification 
ignores the fact that when discharge 
is permitted, a creditor’s incentive to 
lend is seriously blunted. Is not the 
reduction in lending that is sure to 
result an important loss from a societal 
point of view? This is an important 
objection, and it brings us to the issue 
of whether discharge can be justified 
from a pre-debt perspective. As we will 
see, discharge can be justified from a 
pre-debt perspective, but the argument 
in favor of it must be amended in an 
important way.
RETHINKING THE  (POST-
DEBT) LOGIC OF A FRESH 
START FROM A PRE-DEBT 
PERSPECTIVE      
We will continue with our ex-
ample of creditor C and debtor D, but 
we will now focus on their situation 
as they contemplate entering into a 
lender-borrower relationship.  To do so 
requires extending the example. The 
extended example explains that if the 
lender understands the circumstance 
under which his creditor will default, 
and he can act to avoid that circum-
stance, then fresh start serves no useful 
purpose.  In fact, instituting a policy 
of fresh start in such a situation could 
make matters worse!  
We will assume that both C and 
D are forward-looking: Each person 
fully understands how the other will 
act in the future if a loan is made. 
We will continue to assume that D’s 
circumstances are exactly as before: 
She has a full-time job earning $2000 
a month with the option of working 
fewer hours; she has no assets; and her 
monthly nondiscretionary expenses 
are $1800. To keep matters simple, we 
will also assume that D does not plan 
to save any portion of her resources for 
the foreseeable future. This means that 
she will spend any loan granted to her 
and she will not have any property a 
creditor can grab in the future. Finally, 
we will assume that the best alterna-
tive use of C’s funds is a risk-free in-
vestment that will earn him 5 percent 
per year.
Consider first the case where 
discharge is not permitted. From our 
previous discussion, we know that if D 
borrowed a lot of money, she will not 
pay it back. Being forward-looking, 
C understands this fact and will not 
lend a lot of money to D. Indeed, the 
most C would be willing to lend is the 
present value of the longest stream of 
$200 monthly payments D can handle. 
Let’s assume that the longest stream is 
12 months; that is, if D is faced with 
the prospect of making 13 or more 
monthly payments of $200 each, she 
will stop making payments and take 
the less work option. But if she needs 
to make fewer than 13 monthly pay-
5 This is the sense in which economic logic 
puts lenders and borrowers on an equal footing: 
Any gain or loss to the  lender that comes at 
the expense of an equivalent loss or gain to the 
borrower is viewed as being neutral with regard 
to gains or losses to society as a whole.
6 It could be argued that the inefficiency could 
be avoided without permitting discharge if C 
and D negotiated a better outcome. After all, 
C must understand that if he insists on getting 
all of his $5000 back, he will get nothing. Given 
this, he might offer to partially forgive D’s debt, 
and D might well accept such an offer and go 
back to working full-time. However, it’s likely 
that C is dealing not only with D but with many 
other debtors, and C must be cognizant of the 
fact that forgiving D’s debt might embolden 
other debtors to demand a similar consider-
ation. These external effects might prevent an 
efficiency-restoring renegotiation between C 
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ments, she will continue making them. 
In this case C can lend, at most, $2238 
(rounded) to D without losing money 
on the deal.  This amount of $2238 is 
simply the present discounted value 
of 12 monthly receipts of $200 each 
when the annual interest rate is 5 per-
cent. This is the key difference when 
matters are viewed from the pre-debt 
perspective: If C is aware of the level 
of debt beyond which D will default, 
he will rationally lend less than that 
amount and default will not occur. 
If foresight can prevent default, the 
post-debt rationale for discharge does 
not apply.
In fact, having a discharge policy 
in place can actually make matters 
worse.  Consider the above contract 
that requires D to pay $200 a month 
to C for 12 months. Would D have the 
incentive to adhere to this contract if 
she has the option to invoke discharge? 
The answer depends on the pecuni-
ary and psychological costs of invok-
ing discharge. The pecuniary costs of 
discharge include the out-of-pocket 
expenses of going to court, the cost of 
not being able to borrow again for an 
extended period of time, and the cost 
of being barred from certain types of 
employment following default.7 The 
psychological cost might stem from a 
feeling of shame in having failed to 
meet one’s obligations.  If these costs 
are high enough, D will adhere to the 
contract.
But it is also possible that these 
costs are too low to prevent D from 
invoking discharge.  If this is the 
case — and C is aware that D’s costs 
of discharge are low — the amount C 
would be willing to lend to D will be 
less than $2238. How much less? For 
concreteness, suppose that the costs 
of discharge are such that D would 
adhere to the contract if she had six 
or fewer monthly payments of $200 to 
make. Then, the most that C would 
be willing to lend would be $1183 
(rounded). This amount is the present 
discounted value of six monthly pay-
ments of $200 each when the annual 
interest rate is 5 percent. 
Thus, a discharge policy may have 
the effect of reducing D’s credit limit 
from $2238 to $1183.  However, it is 
entirely possible that D would actu-
ally prefer to borrow more than $1183 
and pay it back but the existence of a 
discharge policy makes it impossible for 
her to do so. The bottom line is that 
a discharge policy can have adverse 
effects on borrowers by making it too 
easy for them to default and conse-
quently make creditors less willing to 
lend.
This objection to a discharge 
policy is implicitly recognized and 
countered in the Supreme Court ruling 
quoted earlier. Recall that the ruling 
made reference to the “honest but un-
fortunate debtor” in making the case 
for discharge. Evidently, the court was 
drawing attention to the fact that mis-
fortune plays a role when people don’t 
pay back their debts. And indeed, as 
argued in the next section, the risk of 
bad outcomes can provide a justifica-
tion for a discharge policy.
THE ROLE OF RISK IN 
RESTORING THE (PRE-DEBT) 
LOGIC OF A FRESH START
To explain the role of risk, we will 
7 Failure to meet debt obligations is recorded 
in a person’s credit history. This history is 
available to potential creditors and employers. 
A tarnished credit history typically leads to 
difficulties in obtaining new loans and could 
lead to difficulty in obtaining certain types of 
employment. 
extend our example one more time. 
The point of the extended example is 
that the risk of not being able to repay 
gives a fresh start a benefit that may 
counter its costs. The benefit is that in 
the event that the debtor is unable to 
repay, she can invoke discharge and be 
relieved of the burden of her debt. But 
the debtor may choose to invoke dis-
charge even when she has the capacity 
to repay. To avoid this outcome, the 
creditor must reduce the amount lent, 
which is the cost.
Imagine that in the month imme-
diately after D takes out her loan there 
is a small chance that her discretionary 
income will fall permanently to $100. 
We will assume that D is contemplat-
ing entering into a contract wherein 
she promises to pay $200 each month 
for some (to be determined) set of 
months. The question we want to 
answer is: How much would C be will-
ing to lend to D, recognizing that D’s 
discretionary income may fall to $100?
Let’s answer the question first 
for the case where discharge is not 
permitted. If D’s discretionary income 
remains $200 in the first month of the 
loan, she will be in a position to make 
12 monthly payments of $200 (which 
is the maximum number of months she 
can promise, given that she can choose 
the less work option and not pay any-
thing). But if her discretionary income 
falls to $100 in the first month, she 
will be in default.  At that point, C will 
have the right to “tax” away all of D’s 
discretionary income until all obliga-
tions are met. Faced with this “tax,” D 
will choose the less work option (that 
is, reduce her discretionary income to 
The risk of not being able to repay gives a 
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zero by working fewer hours) and never 
repay anything.8 Knowing this, C will 
be willing to lend somewhat less than 
$2238 against D’s promise to pay $200 
each month for the next 12 months. 
By offering to lend somewhat less than 
$2238, C will get more than a 5 per-
cent rate of return on his investment 
in the event D actually pays back. This 
return above the opportunity cost of 
his funds (which by assumption is 5 
percent) is C’s compensation for taking 
on the risk that D will default on the 
loan.
Now let’s answer the question 
assuming that discharge is permitted. 
In this case, D will adhere to her loan 
contract as long as she has six or fewer 
monthly payments of $200 to make 
(which is the maximum number of 
months she can promise to pay, given 
that she has the option to invoke 
discharge and walk away from her 
debt) and her discretionary income is 
$200.  If her discretionary income falls 
to $100 in the first month of the loan, 
she will invoke her right to discharge 
and walk away from her debt.  Again, 
anticipating this, C will be willing to 
lend somewhat less than $1183 against 
D’s promise to pay $200 each month 
for the next six months because there 
is the small chance that D will not 
make any payments at all.
The bottom line is that without 
the possibility of discharge, the “hon-
est but unfortunate” debtor runs the 
risk of being condemned indefinitely to 
life under the threat of seizure, a situ-
ation that is both unpleasant and bad 
for work effort. Permitting discharge 
eliminates this possibility but reduces 
the maximum amount a debtor can 
borrow. The amount the debtor can 
borrow is less because the lender must 
make certain that the debtor has the 
incentive to repay even when there 
is no financial hardship. If debtors’ 
aversion to the risk of bad outcomes is 
sufficiently strong, or if their need to 
borrow is sufficiently weak, then from 
the debtors’ perspective permitting 
discharge will be preferable to prohibit-
ing it.
This risk-based logic for discharge 
is further strengthened if we recognize 
that lenders need not bear any losses 
from having a discharge policy in 
place. This is so because in the (likely) 
event that D does make all six of her 
monthly payments of $200 each, C 
earns more than a 5 percent rate of re-
turn (annualized).9 Therefore, by lend-
ing on similar terms to many people, 
C can use the additional returns from 
the above-5-percent interest rate paid 
by nondefaulting debtors to offset the 
losses inflicted by defaulting debtors 
and still obtain an average return of 5 
percent on his investments.
From the pre-debt perspective, 
then, the case for a discharge policy 
rests ultimately on the risk of bad 
outcomes and the fact that discharge 
provides a form of insurance against 
this risk. The economic logic of a fresh 
start then comes down to a compari-
son between the benefits of insurance 
and the costs of a reduced borrow-
ing capacity. If enough people in the 
economy value the insurance benefit 
of a discharge policy more than the 
cost of a reduced borrowing capacity, a 
policy of discharge, or fresh start, will 
be socially desirable.
FRESH START AND THE 
EVOLUTION OF U.S. 
BANKRUPTCY LAW
The economic logic of a fresh start 
provides insights into the history of 
the evolution of personal bankruptcy 
law in the U.S., in particular, into 
Americans’ divergent attitudes, over 
time and space, toward the efficacy 
of a discharge policy. An obvious but 
nevertheless important point about the 
economic logic is that it states condi-
tions under which having a discharge 
policy is socially desirable. Thus, if we 
observe an economy that looks upon 
a discharge policy with disfavor — or 
vice versa — the economic logic of a 
fresh start suggests reasons this might 
be so. 
The colonial history of the United 
States affords a unique opportunity to 
observe the economic logic of a fresh 
8 D’s options are to hand over all of her dis-
cretionary income for the next 24 months or 
reduce her work effort. Since the less work 
option is preferable to the prospect of handing 
over all her discretionary income for the next 
13 (or more) months, she will surely choose the 
less work option when faced with the option of 
handing over all of her discretionary income for 
the next 24 months.
9 This is so because C lent an amount less than 
$1183 but insisted that D pay back $200 for six 
months. For instance, if C lent only $1500, the 
implicit interest rate in the event D paid back 
the loan would be about 15 percent. 
The economic logic of a fresh start provides 
insights into the history of the evolution 
of personal bankruptcy law in the U.S., in 
particular, into Americans’ divergent attitudes, 
over time and space, toward the efficacy of a 
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start at work.10 Each of the 13 original 
colonies started out with debtor and 
creditor rights based on English laws. 
These laws gave creditors the right to 
seize the property of insolvent debtors 
and, if there was any suspicion that 
the debtor was hiding property, to 
imprison him or her. There are ample 
records of impoverished insolvent 
debtors spending years in jail petition-
ing colonial legislatures for relief. A 
discharge of debt was possible at the 
behest of the creditor only. 
But as time progressed, the colo-
nies altered these laws to suit their own 
needs.11  As one would expect from the 
post-debt logic of a fresh start, the law 
that came under pressure first was the 
law permitting the imprisonment of 
debtors. It was clear to everyone that 
keeping insolvent debtors in jail for 
years served no useful purpose. It was 
unlikely that someone who had been 
imprisoned for several years had any 
hidden wealth, so creditors were not 
being served by this imprisonment and 
society lost the labor of the imprisoned 
debtors. Bowing to public pressure, 
Massachusetts enacted a debtor relief 
law in 1698, which permitted insolvent 
debtors who owed less than £500 to 
obtain their release from jail upon 
swearing an oath of poverty. But the 
law did not discharge debts: Debtors 
were responsible for paying back every-
thing they owed, and creditors retained 
the right to attach future property ac-
cumulated by insolvent debtors toward 
satisfaction of any unmet obligations.
As the discussion of the post-debt 
logic of discharge would lead us to 
expect, this law had an adverse effect 
on the work effort and savings of in-
solvent debtors released from jail. Why 
would an insolvent debtor exert effort 
and accumulate wealth if his creditors 
could “tax” it all away? The Massa-
chusetts legislature acknowledged this 
problem when, in 1725, it noted that 
the law had been a “…great encourage-
ment to idleness and ill-husbandry, and 
too much a temptation to perjury…” 
and repealed it. Nevertheless, similar 
laws were passed periodically until 
1787, when relief of debtors who owed 
moderate amounts of money was made 
a permanent part of Massachusetts 
law. The experience of Massachu-
setts in this regard is similar to that 
of the other colonies that enacted 
debtor-relief laws. But even though the 
post-debt logic of discharge was quite 
apparent to the Massachusetts legisla-
ture, neither it nor most other colonial 
legislatures permitted discharge of debt 
until much later.
This reluctance to permit dis-
charge can be explained from the 
perspective of the economic logic of 
a fresh start. Recall that permitting 
discharge leads lenders to lend less. 
Hence, whenever the capacity to bor-
row is really important to people, we 
can expect society to be hostile to the 
idea of discharge. There is ample his-
torical evidence that in the early years 
of colonization, ordinary people acutely 
felt the need to borrow. To quote 
historian Bruce Mann: “Debt was an 
inescapable fact of life in early Amer-
ica. One measure of how thoroughly 
this was so is in the pervasiveness 
of debts owed and owing in probate 
inventories….Debt cut across regional, 
class, and occupational lines. Whether 
one was an Atlantic merchant or a 
rural shopkeeper, a tidewater planter or 
a backwoods farmer, debt was an inte-
gral part of daily life.” This one single 
fact probably goes a long way toward 
accounting for the general reluctance 
of colonists to enact a discharge policy. 
When a person’s ability to earn a liv-
ing depends on his or her capacity to 
borrow, it is not in the interests of a 
people to erect barriers to the flow of 
credit by making it difficult for credi-
tors to collect on their loans.12
Nevertheless, a few colonies did 
enact discharge laws fairly early in 
their histories: Rhode Island, New 
York, Maryland, and South Carolina.13 
These exceptions may also be consis-
tent with the logic of a fresh start. As 
historian Peter Coleman notes, these 
10 The discussion in this section draws from 
three sources. Most heavily, it draws from Peter 
Coleman’s highly regarded history of insolvency, 
imprisonment, and bankruptcy in colonial 
America. It also draws from historian Bruce 
Mann’s recent book on colonial America’s at-
titude toward debt and debtors, and it draws 
from David Skeel’s fascinating account of the 
century-long legislative struggle to establish a 
federal bankruptcy law.
11 Thus, with regard to bankruptcy laws, the 
colonies acted like small, largely independent 
democratic countries with legislatures attuned 
to the needs of their respective citizenry, a fact 
that imperial authorities in Britain did not 
always care for but put up with nevertheless. 
Interestingly, this situation continued after 
independence because even though the Consti-
tution gave the federal government the right to 
devise “uniform laws regarding bankruptcy,” no 
long-lasting federal bankruptcy law was devised 
until 1898.  Thus, the states (and territories) 
continued to enact local bankruptcy laws to 
meet their own individual needs until the dawn 
of the 20th century.
12 The colonies tempered the adverse conse-
quences of not having a discharge policy by 
modifying creditors’ rights. Many colonies 
passed laws that prevented creditors from imme-
diately seizing the assets of borrowers in default. 
These “stay laws” gave insolvent debtors breath-
ing room to meet their obligations. That way, if 
the reason for their inability to meet debt pay-
ments was temporary, they were not deprived 
of their assets. Also, during times of general 
colony-wide financial distress, many colonies 
passed laws that discharged the debts of people 
who were insolvent on a particular date. In this 
fashion, many colonies provided relief to debtors 
on an ad hoc basis without having an official 
discharge policy in place. See the article by Ian 
Domowitz and Elie Tamer for a description of 
how business conditions influenced bankruptcy 
legislation.
13 Pennsylvania did not enact a discharge policy, 
but a discharge policy for the residents of the 
county of Philadelphia was enacted and allowed 
to stand for a brief period. New Jersey had a 
discharge policy in place during 1771-1787 but 
abolished it thereafter. Delaware did not permit 
discharge until 1900. Massachusetts, the place 
where America’s industrial revolution took 
root, enacted a discharge policy in the mid-19th 
century.  Business Review  Q1  2008   7 www.philadelphiafed.org
colonies stood out for being heavily 
commercialized. In these colonies we 
would expect a discharge policy to 
reflect the needs of entrepreneurs, a 
class of people for whom risk-sharing is 
more critical.14
After independence, the U.S. 
Constitution granted the federal gov-
ernment the right to enact a uniform 
bankruptcy law. But attempts to do so 
failed miserably for almost a century. 
Historians have puzzled over why it 
took so long for a bankruptcy bill to 
pass and what led to its passage and 
success in 1898. As with any other 
piece of legislation, special interest 
groups had a lot of influence in shap-
ing the character of various bankrupt-
cy bills. But because of the ubiquity of 
debt in early America, the fairness and 
practicality (or lack thereof) of any 
bankruptcy law became quickly appar-
ent to people, and if the law performed 
poorly, it did not last. 
Put differently, the economic logic 
of a fresh start was a constant reality 
check on the interest-group logic of 
relief laws passed by lawmakers.15 It is 
significant that the 1898 bankruptcy 
bill – the one that eventually lasted 
long enough to become permanent – 
allowed U.S. states to have a say in lo-
cal discharge policy. Thus, a discharge 
policy suited to local needs became 
possible, and the law itself found ac-
ceptance. It is perhaps also significant 
that by the end of the 19th century, 
America was no longer a nation of 
“rural shopkeepers, tidewater planters 
or backwoods farmers.” It was a nation 
where three-quarters of industrial out-
put was generated in business corpora-
tions. The rise of corporations meant 
that ordinary people were much more 
likely to be wage earners and thus less 
reliant on credit to earn a living.
Now, at the start of the 21st cen-
tury, the situation has changed. Once 
again, debt has assumed greater impor-
tance in the lives of ordinary people. 
People and businesses expect to buy 
and sell all manner of consumer goods 
and services on credit, a development 
that began with the proliferation of 
consumer durables in the 1920s, most 
notably automobiles. Thus, credit for 
ordinary people (consumer credit) has 
again become an integral part of our 
economic system, and, predictably, this 
development has led to dissatisfaction 
with the policy of discharging debts.16
The latest bankruptcy bill puts sig-
nificant restrictions on who can avail 
themselves of the right to discharge.17 
Recall that although a discharge policy 
is primarily meant to give the borrower 
an escape route if his or her capacity 
to repay is impaired, a lender must 
contend with the fact that a borrower 
might invoke discharge even when 
he or she has the capacity to repay. 
Indeed, the reason the creditor (in our 
example) had to restrict his lending to 
the debtor was to ensure that the debt-
or invoked discharge only when her 
capacity to repay was impaired. The 
latest bankruptcy bill is an attempt 
to relax this limitation on lending by 
insisting that the debtor cannot invoke 
discharge if she has the capacity to 
repay. In this spirit, the law does not 
allow households with above-median 
income to invoke discharge. The result 
of the law will be to make more credit 
available at cheaper terms – something 
the average consumer presumably 
wants and will benefit from.18
CONCLUSION
U.S. law gives individual debtors 
the right to petition a bankruptcy 
court and ask to be released from 
their financial obligations to creditors. 
This right is referred to as the law’s 
fresh start provision – after a famous 
Supreme Court ruling that succinctly 
captured the basic reasons for having 
such a policy. As discussed at length 
in this article, the reasons fall into 
14 It is important for entrepreneurs to be able to 
borrow in order to get a venture going. If the 
initial venture is successful, further expansion 
can be financed by borrowing against accumu-
lated assets. 
15 Interest-group politics explains regulatory 
capture: how interest groups can use the law 
to their own benefit. It explains why regula-
tion might end up serving the interests of the 
industry it regulates rather than the interests of 
society as a whole.
16 There are more subtle changes at work as 
well. Because fresh start is a form of insurance, 
the need for it is not as great if there are other 
forms of insurance available. Since the early 
1940s, unemployment insurance has become 
widely available in the U.S., and this develop-
ment makes people more willing to accept limits 
on discharge policy in return for an increased 
capacity to borrow. See the article by Kartik 
Athreya for more discussion of the interaction 
between unemployment insurance and fresh 
start.
17 The Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Con-
sumer Protection Act of 2005 did more than 
just restrict access to discharge for above me-
dian-income households. See Loretta Mester’s 
article for a comprehensive discussion of the 
reform (when the act was still in the proposal 
stage) and the empirical research on bankruptcy 
and credit that bears on it. 
The latest bankruptcy bill puts significant 
restrictions on who can avail themselves of
the right to discharge.
 
18 My article with Dean Corbae, Makoto Naka-
jima, and Vìctor Rìos-Rull examines this issue 
in a numerically specified model of the U.S. 
economy and concludes that restricting above-
median-income households’ access to fresh start 
will benefit the average U.S. household.8   Q1  2008 Business Review   www.philadelphiafed.org
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